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Abstract—User-provided connectivity (UPC) services offer a
possible alternative, or complement, to existing infrastructurebased connectivity. A user allows other users to occasionally
connect through its “home base” in exchange for reciprocation,
or possibly compensation. This service model exhibits strong
positive and negative externalities. A large user base makes the
service more attractive, as it offers more connectivity options to
roaming users, but it also implies a greater volume of (roaming)
traffic passing through a user’s home base, which can increase
congestion. These interactions make it difficult to predict the
eventual success of such a service offering, and in particular
how to effectively price it. This paper investigates a two-price
policy where the first price is an introductory price that expires
once service adoption reaches a certain level. The paper uses a
simplified analytical model to investigate pricing strategies under
this policy, and their sensitivity to changes in system parameters.
The insight and practical guidelines this yields are validated
numerically under more realistic conditions.

I. I NTRODUCTION
User-provided connectivity (UPC) has emerged as a possible “organic” service model for ubiquitous connectivity. The
approach was first made popular by FON (www.fon.com) that
introduced a community-based Internet access model, where
roaming FON users are allowed access to the Internet through
the home connection of other FON users1 . Home access is
through a dedicated device (the FONERA) that connects to
the Internet over a standard broadband connection, and allows
shared Wi-Fi access (for FON subscribers) to that connection.
The main value of the service is in offering connectivity
beyond a user’s home base, and this value grows with service
coverage, i.e., the first user derived no additional value beyond
standard Internet connectivity, while a user joining a network
with over 4 million FON spots worldwide (as of 2011) clearly
sees a much higher value. On the flip-side, a large number of
FON users also means greater odds of having to share one’s
home connection. High levels of roaming traffic2 may incite
some of the more “sedentary” users who joined early (lack of
coverage had little impact on them) to leave. If this happens,
coverage may decrease enough to affect the service’s value to
frequently roaming users, who may in turn start leaving.
In [1], we developed a simple model to elucidate adoption
patterns for such a service. Our focus in this paper is on pricing
The work was supported by NSF grant CNS-0915982.
1 See also KeyWifi (http://keywifi.com) for a similar service.
2 The FONERA can control how much access bandwidth is available to
other users, but that share must be high enough to deliver acceptable service
to roaming users.

strategies and how prices should be set to maximize the profit
of a UPC service provider. Pricing policies in general may
vary and range from non-discriminatory (same price for all
users) to various levels of price discrimination, e.g., see [2]
for a review. In this paper, we limit ourselves to a basic twoprice policy, where one price is an introductory price that
ends once service adoption reaches a certain level. This is an
example of a discriminatory policy, where price discrimination
is a function of when a user adopts.
The investigation of this paper is initially analytical in
nature, and builds on the simple model of [1]. As argued in
Section II, in spite of its simplicity the model captures key
aspects of a UPC service adoption, and its analysis provides
insight into how to price such a service. The applicability of
this insight to more realistic settings is validated numerically
for various relaxations and generalizations of the model’s
assumptions. The paper’s contributions are not so much the
derivation of “optimal” prices. Its simplified model may in fact
not match any real system, so that exact prices are of limited
practical relevance. Instead, the paper’s main contributions
are in using the results of the analysis to develop qualitative
pricing guidelines for successful UPC service deployments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the model and its parameters. Solution methods and
results are presented in Section III, while Section IV tests and
demonstrates their robustness. Finally, Section V gives a brief
overview of related works, and Section VI summarizes the
paper’s results and points to possible extensions.
II. M ODEL F ORMULATION
This section first summarizes the simplified model introduced in [1] and its applicability to UPC services such as
FON. The two-price strategy is then presented, together with
the corresponding revenue maximization problem.
A. Service Utility Function
As commonly done [3], service adoption decisions are based
on a utility function, with a user adopting when its utility is
non-negative. The simple3 utility function we use is given in
Eq. (1), whose terms we review next.
U (θ) = γ + θ(2x − 1) − cm − pθ .

(1)

3 The utility function of Eq. (1) is simpler than that of [1], where users can
be compensated for external traffic using their Internet access.

γ corresponds to the intrinsic utility that any user derives from
home connectivity. In the case of FON this corresponds to
the value of Internet connectivity and services through the
FONERA itself. Because our focus is not on exploring how
basic Internet connectivity entices users to sign-up for the
service, we assume the same γ for all users. Differentiation
between users is introduced through the parameter θ that
measures a user’s propensity to roam and, therefore, seek
Internet access when away from home. θ is taken to be
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. A FON user with θ = 0
never attempts to connect to the Internet through other users’
FONERA, while a user with θ = 1 is constantly on the road in
need of nearby FONERAs to access the Internet. The former
user sees little or no benefits from FON’s shared connectivity,
while the latter heavily depends on it. Conversely, a θ = 1
user imposes its entire Internet traffic on other users’, while a
θ = 0 user has no such impact. These two competing factors
are reflected in the terms θ(2x − 1) and −cm, respectively.
The term θ(2x − 1) measures the service utility to roaming
users. It depends on how often a user roams, θ, and the service
coverage (adoption), x, that ranges from 0 to 100%. Note that
when coverage is low (x < 1/2), roaming utility is negative4 .
In other words, until the odds of finding an available FONERA
while roaming are high enough, the limited coverage of the
service is a deterrent. As more users join, coverage improves
and the service’s value grows as it becomes easier for roaming
users to locate Internet access. This valuation is weighed by a
user’s own θ value that specifies how often it takes advantage
of it. The function −cm is a negative, decreasing function of
the volume m of roaming traffic that users generate, i.e., traffic
that is directed to other users’ Internet access, which captures
the negative impact this traffic can have on a user’s home
access. The parameter c is a normalization factor. Note that
the volume of roaming traffic, m, grows not just as a function
of the number x of adopters, but also as a function of who
those adopters are, i.e., their θ values. Finally, pθ represents
the cost of the service to users, which as the notation indicates
could vary across users.
The two-price policy and the profit maximization problem
are introduced next.
B. Two-Price Policy
The major differentiation of a UPC service over traditional
home-base connectivity is the ability to connect while roaming. Because this added-value is realized only when adoption
is high enough, the adoption timing of a UPC service displays
a strong correlation with θ, a user’s propensity to roam.
Specifically, as a UPC service starts off with limited or no
coverage, it is initially attractive only to sedentary users that
make up the early adopters. As these users join and coverage
correspondingly increases, frequently roaming users gradually
find the service more appealing and start joining.
4 As

discussed in [1], an equivalent formulation uses a roaming utility that
is a positive, increasing function of coverage, and instead scales down the
valuation of home connectivity by (1 − θ).

The consequence of this adoption pattern is that a low
introductory price is typically needed to facilitate the initial
build-up of a user-base. However, keeping the price low as
coverage increases does not allow the service provider to
extract the value created by the higher coverage. This can be
remedied by allowing the provider to switch to a higher price
once coverage is high enough, i.e., introduce time-based price
discrimination. Note that implicit in this two-price policy is
that a high final adoption level is realized, i.e., late adopters
can be charged more only if they derive greater value from the
service because of high coverage. This implies an introductory
price low enough to not only bootstrap adoption, but also
to ensure that if price was kept unchanged adoption would
eventually stabilize at a high level. It is only then, that a
higher final price can be safely introduced to recoup some
of the added value that the high coverage creates.
Specifically, under a two-price policy, the provider has three
decision variables: pi , pf , and xth , where pi is the introductory
price, and xth is the service adoption level (coverage) at which
pricing switches to the final price pf ≥ pi . The provider’s
profit Π(pi , pf , xth ) is then of the form
Π(pi , pf , xth ) = (pi − e) xi + (pf − e) xf ,

(2)

where xi and xf denote the number of adopters that at
equilibrium pay pi and pf , respectively, for the service. e is
the exogenous per-customer cost of offering the service. Note
that xi ≤ xth as some of the initial adopters may ultimately
drop out, i.e., because of the increase in roaming traffic at
higher adoption levels. The provider seeks to identify p∗i , p∗f
and x∗th such that
Π(p∗i , p∗f , x∗th ) = max {Π(pi , pf , xth )} .
pi ,pf ,xth

The provider’s ability to extract the added value associated
with higher coverage depends on both pf and xth . The higher
xth , the more valuable the service has become when the
price is raised. This allows a higher pf , but levied on few
users. Conversely, lowering xth ensures that more adopters
are charged pf , but it limits how much higher than pi , pf can
be. In particular, when the price switch occurs, the θ value of
the last user who joined prior to the switch is θth = xth [1].
The next user considering joining the service has a θ value
of x+
th , but will have to pay pf . If pf is too high, this user’s
utility may be negative, which can then stall adoption.
Ensuring that this does not arise can be formulated more
formally as a constraint. It imposes that when switching to
price pf , the user with θ = x+
th must have positive utility
under the new price. This leads to the following two conditions
(see again Appendix A of [4] for details) that depend on the
position of xth relative to a threshold function of c.
(
1
1
if xth < 4−c
γ − 8−2c
(3)
pf ≤
1
(2 − c/2) x2th − xth + γ if xth ≥ 4−c
The constraints of Eq. (3) are, however, insufficient to ensure that adoption ultimately converges to a high level after
switching to pf . As demonstrated in [1] for a single price, in

some instances adoption need not ever converge to a stable
equilibrium. This can also arise under a two-price policy even
when pf satisfies the constraint of Eq. (3).
Ensuring convergence to a stable equilibrium calls for
additional constraints beyond those of Eq. (3). Unfortunately,
the complex dynamics of adoption under a two-price policy
make the analysis under those constraints challenging. This
is because, unlike what Fig. 1 suggests, the final adoption
region under a two-price policy need not be “contiguous.” In
particular, it is possible for the last adopter paying pi , i.e.,
the adopter with θ = xth , to have a positive utility, while
its immediate neighbor, i.e., the user with θ = x+
th , would
ultimately (when adoption levels converge) have a negative
utility because of the higher price it pays. The utility of users
with higher θ values may, however, remain positive because
of the greater roaming benefits they derive. This creates a
“gap” in the range of θ values of adopters, which makes
characterizing final adoption challenging.
As a result and in order to preserve some level of analytical
tractability, we introduce the added constraint that the twoprice policy achieves equilibrium while maintaining a contiguous (in θ) adoption region. Under this additional constraint,
which is shown in Appendix A of [4] to have minimal impact
on profit, it is possible to identify an analytically tractable
sufficient condition that pf and xth must meet to ensure
the feasibility of an equilibrium, and hence the policy. This
condition is given in Eq. (4), where x = xi + xf is the
equilibrium adoption level (see details in Appendix A of [4]).
pf ≤ (2x − 1) xth + γ − c/2 (−x2 + 2 x) ,

(4)

III. S OLUTION AND G UIDELINES
Under the contiguity requirement, final adoption is as shown
in Fig. 1. More importantly, final adoption is equal to that of
a single-price policy with price pi . Consequently and using
results from [1], x is given by
#
"
p
3 − c + (3 − c)2 + 2 (4 − c) (γ − pi − 1)
.
x = min 1 ,
4−c
Furthermore, given a continuous adoption region, the set xi
and xf of users that pay pi and pf , respectively, are as
illustrated in Fig. 1 and easily seen to satisfy
xi = x − (1 − xth )

(5a)

xf = 1 − xth .

(5b)

This can then be used in Eq. (2) to compute profit as a function
of xth , pi and pf (and the exogenous parameters).
The next step involves maximizing this expression subject to
the constraints of Eqs. (3) and (4). This is done in two phases.
The first phase involves fixing pi and identifying optimal
values for pf and xth given pi . In the second phase, pi is
varied to identify the overall optimal combination.
The outcome of this investigation is shown in Fig. 2,
with details found in Appendix A of [4]. The figure reports
as a function of the exogenous parameter c (x−axis) and
for different γ values (different curves in each sub-figure)

the optimal values of the three parameters of the policy
(pi , pf , xth ) and the resulting profit. Unsurprisingly, the profit
decreases as γ decreases and c increases, since both negatively
affect the overall service value. The more interesting aspect for
our purpose is how changes in γ and c affect the parameters of
the two-price policy. In spite of what may seem like a complex
set of behaviors, relatively clear trends emerge that we can
use to build guidelines for an effective two-price policy. In
particular, one can identify three broad regions associated with
increasing c values (low, medium, high), which give rise to
distinct behaviors for selecting an “optimal” two-price policy.

Fig. 1.

Adoption under a two-price policy.

In the low c range, i.e., c ∈ [0, 0.5], which is where a UPC
service is of most interest, pi and pf follow similar trends
(Figs. 2a and 2b). Both prices are relatively insensitive to
variations in c, and change linearly with γ (curves in each
figure correspond to differences of 0.1 in γ, which all produce
comparable price drops). Similarly and as long as c remains
sufficiently low, the value of xth (Fig. 2c) is mostly unaffected
by changes in either c or γ. Hence, the structure of the policy
that maximizes profit in the low c region is approximately
constant: Both pi and pf prices are relatively insensitive to c
and decrease roughly linearly with γ, while the adoption level
at which pf is introduced stays fixed at xth ≈ 75%.
The insensitivity of xth to both γ and c reflects the fact
that in the low c region where the impact of roaming traffic is
minimal, the service should operate at or near full adoption.
This calls for building a reasonably large user-base before
switching to the new higher price. The initial build-up of
the user base depends on attracting sedentary users who are
relatively insensitive to the low coverage. Realizing this is
determined primarily by γ that represents the bulk of the
service value for those users. Hence, the (linear) sensitivity
of pi to γ is intuitive. The limited sensitivity of pi to c can
also be explained by the fact that to build a large enough
user base, pi must be low enough to not only attract θ ≈ 0
users, but also users with θ > 0. The service valuation of
those users is negatively affected by the low coverage, and pi
must be set low enough to offset that disincentive. This then
means that users with θ ≈ 0 actually have a positive utility
surplus when they join at that price. It is this surplus that
allows them to tolerate a (small) increase in c without calling
for a corresponding decrease in pi .

(a) Optimal pi

(b) Optimal pf
Fig. 2.

(c) Optimal switching point xth

(d) Optimal profit Π

Optimal pi , pf , xth and profit as a function of γ at e = 0.2.

A similar situation arises for pf , even if it affects different
users, i.e., the θ ≥ xth users. When adoption crosses xth and
the price switch triggers, Eq. (3) ensures that pf is selected so
that the user with θ = x+
th has a positive utility. As adoption
increases beyond xth , that user also derives a greater utility
from the improved coverage. This factor, even if it is somewhat
offset by the negative impact of additional roaming traffic,
provides some level of tolerance to increases in c. As shown
in Fig. 2b, this is not always sufficient to completely avoid
some small decrease in pf , but it limits its magnitude.
The other two regions that emerge from Fig. 2, are in a range
from medium to high c values. Intermediate c values (from
c = 0.5 to about 1.25) see decreases in prices and switching
threshold that can exhibit somewhat chaotic behaviors before
they settle to some final low level once c is high enough.
The c value at which this “settling down” occurs depends
itself nearly linearly on γ, i.e., a higher γ corresponds to a
larger c. This is intuitive since the settling down is associated
with configurations where the two-price policy stops being
effective, i.e., a high level of adoption is inefficient.
Furthermore, and as illustrated in Appendix A of [4], the
chaotic behaviors superimposed on the otherwise relatively
steady decline in parameters, can be essentially “ignored”
without much impact on the actual profit. Specifically, rather
than closely track the fluctuations of the switching threshold
xth , it is possible to simply select a threshold value of
xth ≈ 0.5 that corresponds to the threshold used in the high c
region, and similarly ignore fluctuations in either pi and pf
and follow the mostly linear decreases that otherwise prevail.
The reason why these fluctuations can be ignored has its root
in the trade-off between xth and pf . Ignoring a sharp drop in
price offsets the effect of ignoring a sharp drop in xth .
The guidelines that result from the above discussion are
summarized in Fig. 3 that displays three distinct regions. The
region labeled ’N’ corresponds to configurations where the
two-price policy is unable to produce a positive profit. As
mentioned earlier, this arises when “forcing” a high level
of adoption calls for expensive subsidies (low pi ) to entice
enough users to join and stay. These result in negative profits.
This happens when γ is either very low (irrespective of c),

or too low relative to c. For the latter, the cross-over points
lie on the boundary between the ’N’ and ’B’ regions, which
shows a mostly linear relationship between c and γ. On that
boundary, pi , pf , and xth remain essentially constant, with
pi ≈ 0 to attract and keep enough early adopters, pf ≈ 0.3,
and xth ≈ 0.5 (under the simple model of Section II-A).
In region ’B’ prices increase nearly linearly when moving
towards region ’A’ (small c values). When entering ’A’, xth
switches to a higher value (xth ≈ 0.75) and both pi and
pf remain unaffected by further decreases in c and increase
linearly with γ. Note that the fact that region ’A’ does not
extend all the way to γ = 0 is because unless γ ' e, a
positive profit is not feasible.

Fig. 3.

Pricing guidelines for maximum profit

IV. ROBUSTNESS T ESTS
This section offers numerical evidences of the relative
robustness of the guidelines of Section III to errors in the
estimation of exogenous parameters and to changes to the
model’s assumptions, e.g., non-linear externalities and roaming
characteristics that follow a non-uniform distribution. Because
of space limitations, we report only the results of a sample
experiment, with additional results in Appendix B of [4].
Specifically, Fig. 4 displays the cumulative effect of modeling and estimation errors. It assumes that rather than a uniform
distribution, θ follows a bimodal distribution with modes at
0.25 and 0.75, and that externalities are sub-linear rather than
linear, i.e., the users’ utility function is of the form
U (θ) = γ + θ(2x0.9 − 1) − cm0.9 − pθ .

Assuming exogenous parameters with values of c = 0.3, γ =
0.6 and e = 0.2, the guidelines of Section III give pi = 0.4,
pf = 0.9 and xth = 0.75. Fig. 4 plots profit (vertical axis),
as c and γ vary around their assumed values. The thick black
dot in the figure marks the profit in the absence of errors, i.e.,
actual and estimated parameters coincide. The figure shows
that while profit eventually degrades as the errors grow large,
the policy is robust to a wide range of errors in both c and γ.

More recently, [10] considered a similar problem with positive
and negative externalities, which arises when introducing a
new technology to replace an existing one with which it is
compatible. The paper identifies that under the assumption of
linear externalities, the optimal pricing strategy is essentially
similar to the two-price strategy of Section III.
The main difference between this paper and earlier works
is the fact that (negative) externalities depend not just on the
number of users that have joined, but also on which users have
joined, i.e., the impact of a frequently roaming user differs
from that of a sedentary user. The presence of heterogeneity
in how users value the service and how they affect its value is
a key aspect of a UPC service; one that influences its pricing.
VI. C ONCLUSION

Fig. 4.

Robustness of the two-price policy

V. R ELATED W ORKS
There is a vast literature on pricing strategies for products or
services that exhibit externalities. It is not our intent to provide
an exhaustive review. Instead we focus on a small subset of
works most relevant to the problem targeted in this paper.
Early works on pricing in the presence of externalities include [5], [6] that investigated the evolution of prices for products with positive externalities in a monopoly environment. [5]
investigated optimal pricing under linear externalities, while
[6] was primarily interested in how introductory prices allowed
the product to attract a critical mass of adopters.
Optimal pricing in the presence of general positive externalities was more recently investigated in [7] that considered full
discriminatory pricing, and showed that an optimal strategy
could be computed in polynomial time. Based on the results
of its analysis, the paper also proposed what it termed an
“influence-and-exploit” strategy that first gives the product
away to some users to build critical mass before starting
to charge the remaining users. [8] studied mostly the same
problem, but under the assumption that prices could only be
adjusted at discrete time instants.
The topic of optimal pricing for systems with both positive
and negative externalities seems to be have been first addressed
in [9] that sought to optimize a combination of provider’s
profit and consumers’ surplus. Different pricing strategies were
considered, including flat-rate pricing and pricing strategies
that account for the product “amount” consumed by a user5 .
5 Our model does not have a notion of product amount consumed by a user,
but this arises naturally when usage-based pricing is used.

The paper relies on a simple model to develop guidelines
for configuring a two-price policy so as to foster the successful deployment of a UPC service. The guidelines are then
tested numerically for robustness to various relaxations of
the model’s simplifying assumptions. The results help identify
when a two-price policy that includes a low introductory price
can contribute to the eventual success and profit of a UPC
service, and conversely when a UPC service is unlikely to
succeed irrespective of price.
An extension of interest is to explore service models that
include compensation for users that offer access to roaming
users. The latter is especially attractive in a context where
a Wi-Fi based UPC service is used to offload traffic from a
traditional 3G or 4G offering, e.g., see [11].
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